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Abstract:
This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN1 countries, excluding
Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN
countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic diﬀerential games, we contrast the potential gains
or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they
coordinate their monetary and/or ﬁscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players
open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary
authorities. We also ﬁnd that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation de-
pends on the type of shocks and the extent of ﬁscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a
theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.
Keywords: ASEAN economic integration, monetary union, linear quadratic diﬀerential games,
open-loop information structure.
Jel-codes: C61, C71, C72, C73, E17, E52, E61, F15, F42, F47.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the pros and cons of further economic integration of the ASEAN countries.
One of the major goals of the ASEAN countries is to achieve deeper regional integration. Since
the launch of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 19922, ASEAN has entered the ﬁrst stage
toward the process of reaching full economic integration. Full economic integration can be reached
by subsequently forming a customs union, a common market, and an economic union. AFTA has
reached its initial implementation in 2003. Systematic eﬀorts to remove tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers
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1Association of Southeast Asian Nations, its members are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
2ASEAN has been founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and now consists
of ten countries mentioned above. The objective is to promote economic, cultural and political cooperation among
the member countries. During a summit on the island of Bali in 2003, the ”Bali Concord” was signed which foresees
an economic union by 2020.
1are being implemented, and all member countries are committed to make ASEAN a free trade and
tariﬀ zone by 2015. The current debates/challenges center around two questions whether further
adjustments are required beyond the national borders and how to move toward creating an ASEAN
Economic Community. Diﬀerent views about the progress and the future of economic integration
in ASEAN can be found in, e.g., the REPSF3 publications over the last decade, Soesastro (2005),
Plummer (2006), Soesastro (2007) Hashmi and Lee (2008), Lim and Yi-Xun (2008), Heydon and
Woolcock (2009), Park and Park (2009).
Following the seminal works of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) on optimum currency areas
(OCAs), there have been numerous studies that assess the theoretical and practical implications of
forming a monetary union (MU). In particular, the question whether countries form an OCA depends
on the incidence of asymmetric shocks and the asymmetric transmission of shocks. Participating in
a MU comes at the cost of losing monetary authority and exchange-rate adjustments as policy
instruments. Additionally, being a member of a MU implies the need to comply with ﬁscal and other
policy restrictions, like e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) requirements in the European
Monetary Union (EMU). On the other hand, alternative stabilization mechanisms may replace the
role of the exchange-rate adjustment and there may be sizeable beneﬁts outweighing the costs of
participation to the MU. The OCA theory suggests that countries will establish a MU as soon as
properly quantiﬁed economic beneﬁts start to outweigh costs, see e.g. De Grauwe (2000). In a
theoretical setting the question whether countries constitute an OCA can be assessed by comparing
the eﬀects of an asymmetric shock in a country, when it continues its independent monetary policy,
with the eﬀects of the same shock once it has entered the MU. For EMU, OCA issues have received
a lot of attention in the literature; detailed surveys can be found in e.g. Buti and Sapir (1998) and
Plasmans, Engwerda, van Aarle, Di Bartolomeo, and Michalak (2006)[Section 1.4.2].
Most of the studies on the potential of a monetary union in East Asia concentrate on the question
whether these countries constitute an OCA or not - see e.g. Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999),
Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000), Ng (2002), Zhang, Sato, and McAleer (2004), Ramayandi
(2005), Ahn, Kim, and Chang (2006), Sato and Zhang (2006) Kawai (2008), Becker (2008) and
Pontines and Rajan (2009). These studies along with a historical perspective suggest that there is
a growing support for a (partial) MU, however the arguments are mainly based on the ﬁnding that
the number of OCA criteria that are met by (some) of the countries have increased. In particular
the study by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) revealed that the value of their developed optimum
currency index for ASEAN is not very diﬀerent from what it was in Europe prior to the Maastricht
Treaty. On the other hand, a number of these studies also report impediments to the formation of a
(partial) MU (see, e.g., the REPSF reports, Kawai (2008) and Becker (2008)). These concern, e.g.,
the reluctance to lose national sovereignty over economic policymaking, the diversity of economic
and political systems, the lack of a legal framework, too many bilateral trade agreements and the
lack of mutual trust. The creation of a currency union by (some of) the ASEAN countries which can
overcome the above mentioned obstacles is in general foreseen to be a natural step and a ﬂy-wheel
for the ultimate creation of an (East-Asian) MU.
Rather than evaluating the OCA criteria, in this paper we provide a rigorous simulation study in
the framework of linear quadratic (LQ) diﬀerential games to illustrate the potential gains and losses
that might incur from the establishment of a MU in the ASEAN countries (SEAMU thereafter),
in the presence or absence of ﬁscal cooperation. Our simulation study is based on a small-scale
3The Regional Economic Policy Support Facility (REPSF) is one of the components of the ASEAN-Australia
Development Cooperation Program.
2general equilibrium model of the area. Assuming that the current status of economic policy making
is marked by a non-cooperative setting, we show how the eﬀect of cooperation between various
(institutions of) countries can be analyzed. In particular we provide a framework for studying gains
and losses from forming a monetary union among ASEAN countries. This framework is based on
the following setting: under the assumption that SEAMU has been settled, we pose the question
whether participating countries are better oﬀ in this union if an economic shock occurs compared
to the current status quo. This typically involves a dynamic analysis. As shown in e.g. Levine and
Brociner (1994), Hughes-Hallet and Ma (1996), Beetsma, Debrun, and Klaassen (2001), Debrun,
Masson, and Pattillo (2005) and Michalak, Engwerda, and Plasmans (2009), the answer to the
question whether the gains from being in a MU exceed its costs is not clear-cut, as it depends on the
type of shocks, on the gains and losses from ﬁscal cooperation, and on the clash between monetary
and ﬁscal objective functions under (partial) ﬁscal coordination. If a monetary union is formed, it
was shown in a theoretical context that (assuming that the MU’s Central Bank does not participate
in ﬁscal coalitions) non-cooperation of ﬁscal authorities is sometimes the best local governments can
do to cope with certain economic shocks. It is likely that under such conditions, not forming a MU
would be preferable.
Therefore, it is paramount to study the dynamic eﬀects of various shocks within a MU, and com-
pare the potential gains and losses of countries to their status-quo without the formation of a MU.
To that end, in this paper:
* We start by formulating a small-scale dynamic general equilibrium model of nine countries in
ASEAN, which we estimate using recent data. Extensions of our framework for dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models can be found in Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub (2010)
for two players, and for multiple players in Plasmans, Michalak, and Fornero (2006) in an econometric
setting and in Michalak, Engwerda, and Plasmans (2009) in a more theoretical and numerical simu-
lation setting. We chose to work with a simpler model mainly due to limited data availability, that
restricts us from obtaining reliable parameter estimates when estimating a full-scale DSGE model.4
* We use the above model along with quadratic loss functions for monetary and ﬁscal players to for-
mulate a linear quadratic diﬀerential game in continuous time. For dynamic optimization problems
with more than one actor, the information each player possesses about the system plays an important
role in choosing his/her actions. Here we assume that the information about the system is of the
open-loop (OL) type, that is, it is known to all players ex-ante. This structure, while restrictive, is
very useful for learning about the beneﬁts of a MU, and is employed in several studies due to its
analytic tractability.
* We solve the model and derive the properties of its solution. We ﬁnd analytic conditions for the
existence of equilibria in the above model (see e.g. Engwerda (2005) for a detailed discussion of
challenges that arise in the OL setting).
* Given our theoretical insight, we analyze impulse response functions that provide guidelines for
the consequences of diﬀerent economic shocks in diﬀerent economic settings and diﬀerent levels of
policy coordination. In our simulations, we use the numerical toolbox described in Michalak, Engw-
erda, and Plasmans (2011) which is especially suitable for OL type games, and ﬁnd that there are
substantial gains for monetary policy coordination, whether in the form of a MU or not. We also
conclude that the question whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation is not
4Note that the computational details are similar for our model, adapted to discrete time, and a small-scale DSGE
model with two players, but for more than two players and a full-scale model, the existence and properties of the
equilibria are not entirely known; such analyses are beyond the scope of our paper.
3clear cut. Depending on the type of shocks and the extent of ﬁscal policy cooperation, while the
aggregate costs of all countries in the block are similar, individual costs may diﬀer, especially in the
context of the grand coalition of monetary and ﬁscal authorities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general equilibrium model,
while Section 3 provides estimation results for this model. Based on these estimates, we analyze in
Section 5 for the benchmark model two diﬀerent scenarios for policy making, the non-cooperative
and full cooperative case, respectively. For both, we ﬁrst derive conditions for the existence of
equilibria5 and study the analytic properties of our solutions. Comparing these properties with
actual realizations, we conclude that current ASEAN economic policy making is best approached
by a cooperative scenario. In Section 6 we perform a simulation study to quantify the eﬀects on
economic performance of forming a MU, in the absence or presence of ﬁscal policy and cooperation.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Basic Economic Framework
We consider a linear quadratic diﬀerential game model involving N countries participating in an
economic union like the AFTA. With a slight notation abuse, we denote the set of countries by ¯ N :=
{1,2,··· ,N}. We begin by presenting the stylized analytical framework, a small-scale open-economy
dynamic general equilibrium model, see e.g. Plasmans, Engwerda, van Aarle, Di Bartolomeo, and
Michalak (2006)[Section 7.2].6
In the absence of a monetary union, each economy is described by its own aggregate demand (IS)
curve and aggregate supply (AS) curve. The IS curves for each country j are:







where the real output gap in a country, yj, is a function of the domestic real interest rate rj(t) =
ij(t)− ˙ pj(t) - with ij(t) and ˙ pj(t) being nominal interest rates and inﬂation in country j, respectively
- of the domestic real ﬁscal deﬁcit fj(t), of the foreign (real) output and of the competitiveness,
cjk(t). Competitiveness, cjk(t) = ejk(t) + pk(t) − pj(t), is measured by adjusting nominal exchange
rates, ejk(t), for relative prices, pk(t) − pj(t). All variables are in logarithms, except for interest
rates which are in decimal points. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative. The direct
output and competitiveness spillovers are measured by φjk and δjk, respectively. The spillovers
through the interest rate are determined by γj and the ﬁscal deﬁcit spillovers by the direct eﬀects
of ﬁscal deﬁcits, ηj. We treat the variables as deviations from their steady-states, which have been
normalized to zero for simplicity. Nominal exchange rates7, adjusted for relative prices, measure the
international competitiveness of the economy. We start by assuming that the nominal exchange rates
5Details can be found in Appendix C.
6See also van Aarle, Engwerda, and Plasmans (2002) and Neck and Dockner (1995). While attractive, DSGE
models pose various diﬃculties in our setting. Estimation is possible but our data span is too short to provide reliable
results. Calibration is not possible due to the fact that the literature on ASEAN countries is insuﬃciently informative.
Related to the game-theoretic framework, a two-country DSGE model with and without monetary cooperation is
presented in Justiniano and Preston (2010), and the only multi-country extension of a DSGE model that we are aware
of is Michalak, Engwerda, and Plasmans (2009).
7As usual, nominal exchange rates are measured as the (logarithmic) price of one unit of foreign currency, expressed
in domestic currency.
4are determined according to the uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP) hypothesis, an assumption that
we will relax later. That is, they adjust to corresponding interest-rate diﬀerentials:
˙ ejk(t) = ij(t) − ik(t), ejk(0) = ejk0. (2)
The initial values of the exchange rates, ejk0, represent (initial) level shocks that hit the exchange
rate at time zero, reﬂecting e.g. (initial) shocks in international ﬁnancial markets.
In case of a monetary union among some of the ASEAN countries - deﬁned here by a common
currency and a common interest rate - the IS curves in equation (1) become diﬀerent across countries
in and outside the monetary union:
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δjk(pk(t) − pj(t)), j ∈ ¯ NU, (4)
where ¯ NU consists of the countries which engage in the monetary union (and ¯ Nc
U consists of the
remaining countries), cjU(t) = ejU(t) + pk(t) − pj(t), ˙ eUk(t) = iU(t) − ik(t), and iU(t) is the common
interest rate in the monetary union. In this case ˙ ejk(t) = 0 for all t and for countries j,k both in
the monetary union. The external exchange rate of the MU with non-MU countries together with
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and ﬁscal policy are the only shock absorbers. For
simplicity, we assume that when there is a MU, all countries join this MU. This simpliﬁes the analysis
to some extent, since only equations (4) apply in that case.
Equations (5) are open-economy Phillips curves:
˙ pj(t) = ζjyj(t) +
 
k∈ ¯ N/j
ψjksjk(t), pj(0) = pj0. (5)
where sjk(t) = ˙ ejk(t) + ˙ pk(t) reﬂects the “exchange rate pass-through” from country k to country j.
In these Phillips curves, the inﬂation rates of the other countries play a role reﬂecting the eﬀects of
pass-through of foreign inﬂation on domestic currency. Since our focus is on short-run stabilization,
the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy is limited to its transitory impact on output through the induced
stimulus of aggregate demand. In this open-economy setting, monetary policy aﬀects output not
only via the interest-rate channel but also through the exchange-rate channel (i.e. via inﬂuencing
international competitiveness).
In the absence of a monetary union, we assume that the loss functions of ﬁscal and monetary
players are:8
8Most papers consider quadratic losses for monetary and ﬁscal authorities of similar type, see interalia Dixit and







































In (6) we follow the current literature on price level targeting - e.g. Buti and Sapir (1998) - and
assume that the ﬁscal authorities are primarily concerned with the stabilization of the domestic
nominal price, domestic real output gap and domestic real ﬁscal deﬁcit. The parameter θ denotes
the rate of time preference and αℓ
j, βℓ
j and χℓ
j, where ℓ = F,M, represent preference weights that are
attached to the stabilization of inﬂation, output and ﬁscal deﬁcits, respectively. Preference for a low
ﬁscal deﬁcit could reﬂect the costs of excessive deﬁcits - which are in fact sanctioned in the EMU
case by the SGP. Moreover, costs could also result from undesirable debt accumulation and inter-
generational redistribution that high deﬁcits bring about and, in that interpretation, χF
j could also
reﬂect the priority attached to ﬁscal retrenchment and consolidation. Similarly, the loss functions
JM
j in (7) assume that the monetary authorities direct their policies at stabilizing the price level,
the output (gap) and the interest rate. Moreover, it indicates that active use of monetary policy
invokes costs for the monetary policymaker: other things equal he/she would like to keep his/her
policy instrument constant, avoiding large swings.






















j∈ ¯ NU ωjpj(t) is the loglinearized aggregate price level, yU(t) =
 
j∈ ¯ NU ωjyj(t) is the
loglinearized aggregate output (gap), and αM
U and βM
U indicate the relative preferences of the Central
Bank (CB) of the MU concerning inﬂation and output of the MU as a whole. Parameter ωj indicates
the relative weight of country j in the MU (
 
j∈ ¯ NU ωj = 1). The minimization of the CB’s loss
function w.r.t. iU is consistent with the derivation of a standard monetary policy rule, since it
results in a linear function in its arguments - see e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
3 Model Estimation
The objective of this section is to estimate the parameters for our ASEAN model described in (1),
(2), and (5), which will subsequently be used to determine the region’s steady-state, and to perform
simulations for revealing the potential gains from monetary and ﬁscal cooperation.
The estimation of the model as described in (1), (2) and (5) poses various diﬃculties, which we
overcome by formulating a simpliﬁed model, performing robustness checks of our estimates across
countries and providing a baseline speciﬁcation (benchmark model) along with the corresponding
parameter estimates. These are used in Sections 5 and 6 to perform simulations for analyzing pros
and cons of an ASEAN monetary union, in a framework that is from a computational point of view
quite similar to that of a DSGE model combined with game-theoretic behavior, except that it is cast
in continuous time.9
9See Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub (2010) for a DSGE counterpart of our model, limited to two players,
US and the Euro Area.
63.1 Structural equations and identifying restrictions
The model described in (1), (2), and (5) is an unbalanced multivariate panel data model with three
dimensions: N = 9 countries, maximum T = 12 time observations per country, and d = 3 equa-
tions. It can be seen as a multivariate spatial panel with spatial heterogeneity across intercepts and
slopes, and where endogeneity is present not only across equations, but also across countries. The
latter is known as “spatially lagged dependent variables” in univariate models, see Elhorst (2003);
to distinguish this from lagged dependent variables and emphasize endogeneity across the system of
equations, we prefer to call it “spatial endogeneity”. To our knowledge, this is a nonstandard estima-
tion problem due to the multivariate setting, but we show below that under some simpliﬁcations it
can be reduced to settings already present in the literature. We begin by exposing all issues related
to estimation.
First, we note that the UIP hypothesis does not hold upon testing, and its violation is not isolated
to some countries. We therefore rewrite (2) in the spirit of linear exchange rate models - see Plasmans,
Verkooien, and Dani¨ els (1998) and De Grauwe and Vansteenkiste (2007), assuming “partial” parity:
˙ ejk(t) = β0j + β1j(ij(t) − ik(t)).
If we allow for ﬁxed and/or random country-speciﬁc eﬀects, our model becomes:























j(t), pj(0) = pj0. (10)
where αj,βj and ¯ βj are intercepts, di
j are country and equation speciﬁc eﬀects, and ui
j(t) are idiosyn-
cratic errors, for i = 1,2,3.
As can be noted from the model above, if we allow, say, φjk to be diﬀerent across k ∈ N\j, we
would have, even in the absence of country-speciﬁc eﬀects, at least 3(N −1) parameters to estimate,
with NT observations per equation. This gives rise to the well-known incidental parameter problem,
and any estimation with both N and T small as is the case here would yield biased estimates. One
solution is to ignore for each country j the dependence of parameters on other countries k, maintain
parameter heterogeneity across countries, and estimate for each country a separate time series. Such
a procedure would ignore spatial endogeneity as well as co-movement across countries and is thus
not desirable - see Quah (1996). An alternative way to reduce the number of parameters is to join
homogeneous countries in groups, and then have a separate equation for each group. Due to the small
number of observations, we opt for starting with the most parsimonious model, in which αj = α,
βj = β, ¯ βj = ¯ β, φjk = φ, δjk = δ, γj = γ, ηj = η, ζj = ζ, ψjk = ψ, but allowing for random/ﬁxed
eﬀects.10
We check the validity of the restrictions via speciﬁcation checks, including re-estimation by exclud-
ing one country at a time.11 The latter can be viewed as a jackknife procedure without replacement,
10This model is equivalent to a multivariate model with random intercepts but ﬁxed slopes.
11We also tried with excluding two and three countries at a time, but the results are qualitatively similar. They are
available from the authors upon request.
7to check for “outliers”. If the absence of country j changes the results dramatically, we take this into
account by allowing the coeﬃcients to diﬀer for that particular country j.
Finally, the spatial endogeneity in a multivariate panel induces an additional complication related
to setting up the estimation. The latter has been dealt with in univariate settings by rewriting the
model in a reduced form as in Elhorst (2003)[ equation (24)], and we adopt a similar approach here.
We ﬁrst estimate each equation of the system separately, to explore the presence of random or
ﬁxed eﬀects, and sensitivity to instruments. Then we average the variables in each equation of the
system over the other countries and express the bilateral exchange rate as the ratio of the individual
exchange rates with respect to the US dollar, after which we perform a 3SLS procedure.
Under our assumptions, the model in (8), (9) and (10) simpliﬁes to:









˙ ej(t) − ˙ e
∗























to denote the sample average of all N random samples from x, excluding xj.
3.2 Data
The dataset is drawn from ASEAN Statistical Yearbooks for 1995-2007, and from 2002-2007 through
selected ASEAN Indicators. It contains yearly observations from 1995:2006, on the 10 ASEAN
countries. Since budget deﬁcit data is completely missing for Myanmar after 2002, we eliminate
this country from the dataset. The data is an unbalanced panel containing N = 9 countries and
maximum T = 12 years, and the data is detailed below.
Real GDP: yj. It is the log of real GDP per capita measured in units of national currency.
Although Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia have higher real GDP if expressed in US dollars, Figure
3.1 shows that the growth in GDP is quite similar, providing scope for estimating equation (11).
Interest Rates: ij. These are nominal annualized short term interest rates, expressed in decimal
points. Figure 3.2 indicates that the interest rates of Philippines, Indonesia and Laos are quite
volatile, and often move in opposite directions; the remaining interest rates suggest a co-movement.
Inﬂation: ˙ pj. The inﬂation is measured as the annualized percentage increase in consumer price
index (CPI), expressed in decimal points. Figure 3.3 shows that inﬂation is quite high for some
countries, including Indonesia and Laos before 2000.
Exchange Rates: ej. They are measured as the log of nominal exchange rates in units of national
currency per US dollar. Note from Figure 3.4 the similar movement across ASEAN countries despite
the removal of the currency pegs following the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis.
Budget Deﬁcits: fj. They are measured in percentages of GDP.12 From Figure 3.5, note that
some countries are running a budget surplus over the period, while the others’ deﬁcit is relatively
small, suggesting that the ﬁscal tools might not be used intensively for policy purposes.
12Alternatively, one would want to include in (11) budget deﬁcits in levels; the estimation results of Section 3 are
qualitatively similar.
























Figure 3.1: Log real GDP per capita in national currency



















Figure 3.2: Nominal interest rates
3.3 Single Equation Estimation
In our model, ejk(t), ˙ pj(t) and yj(t) are endogenous, and can be estimated jointly via instrumental
variable methods for panel data. To ﬁnd appropriate instruments, we start by separately estimating
equations (11)-(13).

















































Figure 3.4: Exchange rates in $
Aggregate Demand Equation (11). Estimation results suggest the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects,
which we remove by estimating (11) in ﬁrst diﬀerences rather than in levels. We use an Arellano-
Bond estimator, with ﬁrst diﬀerences and/or ﬁrst lags as instruments. The results for all countries
are in Table 1. Note that the results on the budget deﬁcit and real competitiveness are of the wrong
sign, but also insigniﬁcant. The next subsection shows that the single equation estimates for γ and




















Figure 3.5: Budget deﬁcits in % of GDP
Table 1: Estimation of (11) in ﬁrst diﬀerences
α γ η φ δ
-2.5263∗∗ -.0004 -.002 .4095∗∗ -.0058
(1.2184) (.0012) (.0035) (.1600) (.0070)
Subscripts ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are used to indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, respectively 1% level.
Standard errors are reported between parentheses.
δ are quite similar to the system estimates. The validity of instruments is assessed via Sargan tests,
and the instrument set {yj(t − 1),y∗
j(t − 1), ˙ rj(t),fj(t), ˙ cj(t − 1)} is chosen.
Exchange Rate Equation (12). Estimation results do not suggest further dynamics in this
equation. Since a Hausman test does not reject the null of no systematic diﬀerences between RE
and FE estimates at the 5% level we report only RE estimates in Table 2 below. The instruments
used for the nominal interest rate - which is endogenous because inﬂation is endogenous - are:
{yj(t − 1),y∗
j(t − 1), ˙ rj(t),fj(t), ˙ cj(t − 1)}.
Inﬂation Equation (13). This equation also shows no systematic diﬀerence between RE and FE
estimation, with a Hausman test not rejecting at the 1% level. Several instrument sets yield similar
estimates; the estimates with instruments {yj(t−1), ˙ rj(t),fj(t), ˙ cj(t−1),s∗
j(t−1), ˙ pj(t−1), ˙ p∗
j(t−1)},
are summarized in Table 3 below.




Subscript ∗∗∗ is used to indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported between
parentheses.
Table 3: Single Equation Estimation of (12)
¯ β0 ζ ψ
-1.9313 .0417 .1961
(7.1808) (1.6108) (.5844)
3.4 System: Benchmark Model
The previous subsection shows that only the ﬁrst equation has ﬁxed eﬀects (FE), which are removed
by ﬁrst diﬀerencing. The other two equations exhibit random eﬀects (RE), and all of them pass fur-
ther autocorrelation tests. Thus, a joint GMM estimation of the system, with (11) ﬁrst-diﬀerenced,
and (12)-(13) in levels, subject to strong instruments, will yield consistent and eﬃcient estimates
provided that heterogeneity and contemporaneous spatially correlated error structure are somehow
correctly super-imposed in the estimation.13 However, we conjecture that after averaging each equa-
tion in the system with respect to the other countries, both a 2SLS and a 3SLS method will yield
consistent estimates of the parameter values.14 The latter is the method used in the paper, and
has the advantage that heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation among errors in
diﬀerent equations of the system are taken account of.
The baseline speciﬁcation which we will use for system estimation is:
˙ yj(t) = γ ˙ rj(t) + η ˙ fj(t) + φ˙ y
∗
j(t) + δ˙ c
∗
j(t) + vj(t) (14)
˙ ej(t) − ˙ e
∗














where vj(t) = uj(t) − uj(t − 1) refers to ﬁrst diﬀerences, ˙ fj(t) = fj(t) − fj(t − 1), ˙ rj(t) = ij(t) −
˙ pj(t)−ij(t−1)+ ˙ pj(t−1), and the rest of the variables are in percentage growths. The instruments
used are the exogenous variables, along with yj(t−1),y∗
j(t−1), ˙ pi(t−1), ˙ p∗
i(t−1), cj(t−1), s∗
j(t−1),
instruments which arise naturally when ﬁrst diﬀerencing and pass the single equation Sargan tests.
The results from the baseline speciﬁcation (14)-(16) are presented in Table 4; they are accom-
panied by results obtained when excluding a country from the system, one-at-a-time, to assess
robustness of results for diﬀerent countries.
13It is unclear how such a procedure would be pursued in our setting, but it is beyond the scope of our paper.
14The estimates for 2SLS and 3SLS are not very diﬀerent, only their standard errors diﬀer.
12Table 4: Baseline Speciﬁcation (14)-(16)
Without
All B C I L M P S T V
GDP Growth ˙ y (14)
˙ r -.0031∗∗∗ .0002 -.0003 -.0001 -.0017 .0000 .0000 .0003 -.0001 .0000
(.0013) (.0005) (.0008) (.0006) (.0021) (.0004) (.0066) (.0009) (.0005) (.0006)
˙ f -.0021 -.0121 .0021 -.0011 -.0026 -.0006 -.0015 -.0011 -.0007 -0.0033
(.0031) (.0164) (.0035) (.0030) (.0036) (.0020) (.0031) (.0029) (.0029) (.0033)
˙ y∗ .7707 1.0265 1.7398 .8458∗∗ 1.4143 .8303∗∗ 1.0613∗∗∗ 1.0191∗∗∗ 1.6069∗∗∗ 1.5532∗∗∗
(1.0152) (.8324) (1.4377) (.3676) (.9802) (.3395) (0.3496) (.3409) (.2628) (.3667)
˙ c -.0020 -.0170 .1163 -.4633 -1.0232 -.5275 -.0166 -.0004 -.0010∗ -.0018∗∗∗
(.1420) (.9210) (.7504) (.6319) (1.0867) (.3755) (.5734) (.0010) (.0006) (.0007)
Exchange Rates (˙ e − ˙ e∗) (15)
β0 -.0003 .0000 .0233∗∗ .0033 -.0003 .0000 .0000 .0414∗∗ .0000 .0000
(.0024) (.0085) (.0100) (.0065) (.0071) (.0090) (.0089) (.0152) (.0084) (.0083)
i − i∗ .0013∗∗∗ .0025 .0023 .0040∗∗∗ .0030∗∗ .0024∗ .0031∗∗ .0014 .0013∗ .0012
(.0005) (.0015) (.0015) (.0012) (.0015) (.0014) (.0015) (.0021) (.0008) (.0008)
Inﬂation ˙ p (16)
¯ β0 -5.8583∗∗ -11.8776 28.0274∗∗ -5.5450 -3.7917 -12.5325 -9.5172 -5.0261 -8.5201 -11.3548
(2.4715) (11.5782) (13.6566) (10.6091) (12.7638) (12.2174) (11.6498) (10.6315) (9.2500) (9.7673)
y .8298∗∗∗ 1.0382 -1.6917 1.0440 1.0175 1.1525 1.2704 .9951 .8326 1.1049
(.2020) (.8739) (1.1474) (.8565) (.7756) (.9078) (.8809) (.8296) (.6748) (.7551)
s∗ .3369 .9088∗∗ 4.6653∗∗∗ .0257 -.8534 .7962∗ .2088 .1775 .8108∗∗ .8230∗∗
(.0573) (.4094) (1.7045) (.3966) (1.4562) (.4244) (.3409) (.2325) (.3495) (.3290)
Model χ2 Test p-value
y .8601 .0008 .3006 .1976 .2329 .0125 .0319 .0041 .0000 .0001
(˙ e − ˙ e∗) .0097 .0249 .1376 .0015 .0448 .0827 .0404 .4862 .0984 .1217
˙ p .0002 .0020 .0096 .4757 .2697 .0857 .0107 .3841 .0397 .0226
Here, ’All’ indicates all countries, while B=Brunei, C=Cambodia, I=Indonesia, L=Laos, M=Malaysia, P=Phillippines,
S=Singapore, T=Thailand, V=Vietnam, and const denotes the intercept. Subscripts ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are used to indicate signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are reported between parentheses.
1
3Overall, we ﬁnd sizable and often signiﬁcant eﬀects of foreign demand on home demand, and also
that an often signiﬁcant part of exchange rate diﬀerentials is explained by interest rate diﬀerentials
(note that a coeﬃcient of say 0.002 on interest rate diﬀerentials in the exchange rate equation implies
that a 1% diﬀerence in interest rates brings about a .2% change in exchange rate diﬀerentials). Our
estimates suggest that exchange rate diﬀerentials contemporaneously inﬂuence inﬂation rates. Table
4 is particularly informative about the robustness of results to particular countries. Upon comparing
coeﬃcient estimates, we note that Singapore’s competitiveness and potentially their monetary policy
may be diﬀerent, that excluding Cambodia changes the ﬁscal policy and the overall conclusions from
the Phillips curve, but that the exchange rate rule is quite similar across countries. Examining the
data plots shows that Cambodia is among the ASEAN countries with high GDP growth and low
inﬂation, which could explain the diﬀerent behavior. To assess the plausibility of these comments
above, we performed several speciﬁcation checks; Table 5 presents results from the model with lowest
mean squared error (MSE).
GDP Growth ˙ y
˙ r .0026 (.0045)
˙ f -.0002 (.0115)
dCamb × ˙ f .1849 (.1319)
˙ y∗ .7553 (1.0385)
˙ c∗ .0821 (.0619)
dSing × ˙ c∗ -.8298∗ (.4716)
Exchange Rates (˙ e − ˙ e∗)
intercept -.0003 (.0024)




dCamb × y -1.2832∗∗∗ (.4688)
dep .4773 (.8449)
Model χ2 Test p-value
y .7728
(˙ e − ˙ e∗) .0001
˙ p .0012
Table 5: Baseline Speciﬁcation (14)-(16) with spatial heterogeneity.
Here, dCamb,dSing indicate dummy variables for Cambodia, and Singapore, respectively.
Our estimation results suggest that ﬁscal instruments are not intensively used, and this is a result
that seems to hold true for most countries, likely due to running budget surpluses; therefore, we drop
ﬁscal deﬁcits from the analysis. The ﬁnding related to small coeﬃcients of the interest rates was
investigated through alternative speciﬁcations of the aggregate demand as well as random coeﬃcient
models; the ﬁnding seems to be robust across speciﬁcations.15
The new model with no ﬁscal component is more robust to excluding diﬀerent countries, although
it still reveals issues in estimating the competitiveness parameter. However, such issues are well
15The interested reader can get these results from the authors.
14documented in the empirical literature. We thus use model (14)-(16) and its estimates from the ﬁrst
column in Table 4, but we set δ = η = 0 in Sections 5 and 6.1 to analyze gains from monetary
cooperation. In Sections 6.2/6.3 we chose the parameter that models the eﬀect of ﬁscal instruments
on output, η = 1/8. This parameter is chosen here diﬀerently from zero in order to analyze gains
from ﬁscal cooperation as well. It is chosen somewhat lower than its value observed in EU studies.
We will see that the qualitative results from Sections 5/6.1 and 6.2, where we just compare again the
full (non) cooperative case, are the same. In our preliminary study on the eﬀects coalition formation
within a monetary union can have on economic performance, studied in Section 6.3, it is important
(and realistic) to assume that η diﬀers from zero.
4 Limitations of the Simulation Model
In the previous section we estimated a small-scale open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model.
This model is widely accepted in the literature as describing some key relationships between a number
of important macro-economic variables. We estimated this model using historical data. This implies
that our estimates depend on the pursued past policies and that it is assumed that these policies did
not change over time. Further, only in case policy-makers will use the same strategy in the future
it makes sense to use this model for forecasts. This observation is well-known in the literature as
the Lucas critique. To obtain estimated models that also can be used to predict economic behavior
under diﬀerent policy regimes one could try to model the behavior of individual economic agents,
estimate this, and then aggregate this on a macro-level. This would provide us then with a micro-
founded macro model and might provide a model from which it is more clear to understand the
economic mechanisms driving the results. We did not follow this track here for three reasons. First
of all, this would require a much more detailed study and estimation, from which it is not clear at
this moment whether this is feasible given the available data. Second, in the literature there is a
large dispute whether this aggregation on micro-level makes sense at a macro-level. That is, there
is some reasonable doubt whether these micro-founded models make sense at a macro-level. Third,
it is not our intention to present accurate forecast of economic variables or present accurate optimal
policies for the nearby future. We are merely interested in analyzing the consequences of future
(non)-cooperative behavior on economic performance under diﬀerent scenarios that are robust w.r.t.
the underlying model assumptions.
It is often argued that policy rules that are linear functions of the underlying state variable of the
model are used by actual policy makers (Taylor rule). We will make this assumption here too and
assume that in our estimated model these policy rules have been used and restrict the analysis to a
study of policy rules that are linear functions of the state variable. Based on the information structure
the policymakers have about the system one arrives at diﬀerent ”equilibrium” policy rules. Since a
number of application studies have shown that the diﬀerences in terms of performance between the
most frequently used ”equilibrium” rules is usually not that large, we will assume that the information
structure policy makers have about the game is of the open-loop type (see e.g. Engwerda (2005)).
The big advantage of this assumption is that one can often still derive analytic results, which is
usually not the case under other information structures. As we will see in the next section this is also
the case here. So in this way we can compensate somehow for the above mentioned shortcomings
and obtain more robust conclusions. Of course also the assumption that the policy makers use policy
rules based on an equilibrium concept is just another mathematical abstraction of reality and has as
such its limitations too.
15One of the interesting points of our estimation procedure is that it reports that at this moment
economic policy in ASEAN countries is characterized by a lack of use of ﬁscal instruments. The
parameter, characterizing the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on the economic variables, was estimated to be
zero in our model. Obviously, when creating a SEAMU, countries cannot rely just on the monetary
policy set by the common central bank to cope, e.g., with country speciﬁc economic shocks. So under a
SEAMU ﬁscal policies will be needed to deal with economic shocks. This implies a structural change
in the pursued policies and, in the light of the above mentioned Lucas critique, it might be that
separate from the ﬁscal deﬁcit parameter η estimates of the other parameters change somewhat too.
5 The Simulation Model
Consider thus the model (14) in levels, together with (15)-(16), as a benchmark model, with param-
eter values summarized in Table 6.
Equation (14)
α γ η φ δ





¯ β0 ζ ψ
-5.8583 .8298 .3369
Table 6: System Estimates
By deﬁnition we have that for an arbitrary variable x
 N
i=1(xi − x∗
i) = 0. Using this, with ˜ ei(t) :=
ei(t) − e∗
i(t), the basic empirically found model (hence, without the country and equation speciﬁc
eﬀects and idiosyncratic errors) can be rewritten as
yj(t) = α + γ(ij(t) − ˙ pj(t)) + ηfj(t) + φy
∗
j(t) + δ(˜ ej(t) + p
∗
j(t) − pj(t)), (17)
˙ ˜ ej(t) = β1(ij(t) − i
∗
j(t)), (18)
˙ pj(t) = ¯ β0 + ζyj(t) + ψ(˙ ˜ ej(t) + ˙ p
∗
j(t)), j = 1,··· ,N. (19)
Next, let x = [˜ e1 ···˜ eN−1 p1 ···pN]T. Then the above model can be rewritten in state-space form as
outlined in Appendix A and B, with x as the state of the dynamic system. This model is used to
derive both the analytical and simulation results presented here and in Section 6.
5.1 The general model lacking ﬁscal policies
In this subsection, we analyze the model in the absence of ﬁscal policies. For analyzing impulse
responses, we need to establish the existence and multiplicity of equilibria for the two most important
scenarios we focus on: no cooperation and cooperation of all monetary authorities.
16Given the fact that both parameters η and δ were estimated to be zero in Section 3, we analyze
here the following model:
yj(t) = α + γ(ij(t) − ˙ pj(t)) + φy
∗
j(t), (20)
˙ ˜ ej(t) = β1(ij(t) − i
∗
j(t)), (21)
˙ pj(t) = ¯ β0 + ζyj(t) + ψ(˙ ˜ ej(t) + ˙ p
∗
j(t)), j = 1,··· ,N. (22)
At this moment we do not make any further assumptions on the numerical values of the remain-
ing model parameters. Below, we recall some main conclusions of a theoretical study based on the
structure of model (22), from which the details can be found in Appendices C and D. The study is
about existence and behavior of equilibria under a non-cooperative and cooperative mode of play,
respectively.
Noncooperation
In Appendix C, Corollary 7.3, we show that for an arbitrary choice of the model parameters, this
game has at most one non-cooperative open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibrium.
Next consider the special case that monetary authorities have the same cost function across coun-
tries, yielding αM
j = αM, βM
j = βM and χM
j = χM for j = 1,··· ,N. Corollary 7.7 shows that
if the variables (eigenvalues) λi, i = 1,2, exist as a real number the game has an equilibrium and
otherwise not. As to be expected all parameters that occur in the model as well as the combination
of weights chosen by the monetary policymaker in the cost function and the used discount factor
together determine whether a non-cooperative OLN exists or not. Only the weights chosen by the
ﬁscal policy makers are irrelevant.
Theorem 7.9 describes the evolution of price and exchange rate diﬀerential paths in case an equilib-
rium exists. In case an equilibrium exists, and an asymmetric price shock occurs, the equilibrium
price paths and exchange rate diﬀerentials are (generally) characterized by a constant growth which
is smaller than half the discount factor (1
2θ) used by the policy makers in their cost function. If
a symmetric price shock occurs and an equilibrium exists a diﬀerent equilibrium behavior may oc-
cur. If a symmetric shock occurs it may also happen that prices converge to a new constant level
whereas exchange rate diﬀerentials are characterized by a linear growth. Which equilibrium behav-
ior will occur under a symmetric price shock depends on the chosen weights in the cost function. If
χM > d1(d2−d1)βM (where d1(d2−d1) = 0.2093 for our estimated model parameters) one will observe
a stabilizing price path. Otherwise, an inﬂationary adaptation regime occurs. So, the relative weight
the monetary authority attaches to interest versus output stabilization determines which behavior
occurs. If interest stabilization is the most important issue, the stabilizing price path occurs.
From Corollary 7.11 in Appendix C it follows that in case the game has an equilibrium, an increase
in weight αM or a decrease in either βM or χM may result in a situation where equilibrium ceases to
exist. Figure 5.1 plots for both θ = 0.05 and θ = 0.1, the set of βM and χM parameters for which an
equilibrium exists (assuming αM = 1). The ﬁgure illustrates that the smaller θ is, the smaller is the
set of parameters for which an OLN equilibrium exists. So if policymakers care less about the future
it is more likely that a non-cooperative equilibrium occurs.
Moreover, a direct consequence of Corollary 7.11 is that for the current model parameter estimates
and χM > 0.2093βM the monetary authority can obtain a faster convergence of price and exchange
17rate diﬀerentials towards their new settings compared to the current status quo if it either attaches
more weight to the stabilization of interest rate or output, or by giving less weight to the stabilization
of prices. In case the current status quo is characterized by a situation where χM < 0.2093βM such
a faster convergence can be achieved by either giving more weight to output or price stabilization,
or by giving less weight to interest rate stabilization.
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(a) θ = 0.1.
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(b) θ = 0.05.
Figure 5.1: Dotted area: Cost weights yielding an OLN equilibrium with benchmark parameter
estimates and αM = 1.
To assess the impact of the number of countries on the existence of an equilibrium, we perform a
simulation experiment. The results are gathered in Table 7. In this experiment we used the estimated
model parameters, αM = βM = 1, χM = 2 and θ = 0.116 The table indicates that either a too small
or too large number of countries involved may lead to the non-existence of an equilibrium. So under
those conditions the diﬀerent policy-makers keep on reacting on each-other’s policies without arriving







Table 7: Eﬀect of number of countries on equilibrium existence
Monetary Cooperation
16These results are obtained by verifying whether the eigenvalues mentioned in Corollary 7.7, Appendix C, are both
negative. Note that, while in principle simulations can be performed for any parameter conﬁguration, we believe such
results will not provide additional insights here.
18Next, we analyze the monetary cooperation scenario: when all policy-makers cooperate to ﬁnd
the optimal policy to mitigate an economic shock. Since we restrict our setting, as before, to the
symmetric case, we consider the social outcome (i.e. the case that all concerns of the diﬀerent policy-
makers are equally weighted).17 Even though ﬁscal policies are not used as an instrument to tackle
shocks, monetary policy is aﬀected by the concerns of ﬁscal authorities about the development of
output and prices, and our scenario hypothesizes that monetary authorities give these concerns the
same importance as their own concerns, except w.r.t. the use of ﬁscal instruments which they neglect.
An important distinction w.r.t. the non-cooperative case is that regardless what type of shock
occurs, prices always converge to a new equilibrium point. Furthermore, independent of the number
of participating countries and the choice of parameters, there is always a unique equilibrium. Finally,
either an increase in αi or an increase in βi or χi will lead to faster convergence of prices to their
new equilibrium values, (i = F,M).
Using the estimated parameter conﬁgurations, the resulting closed-loop cooperative model yields
a small trend for the exchange rate diﬀerential of 0.002. Figure 3.3 shows that inﬂation shocks
are only short-lived, whereas Figure 3.4 shows that exchange rates do not change much over time.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 therefore seem to support the idea that our cooperative model yields a good
description of current ASEAN policy making.
6 Simulation Results
In this section we present simulation results in three diﬀerent scenarios:
1. when there is no monetary union, countries pursue individual monetary policies, in the absence
of ﬁscal policies;
2. when there is no monetary union, but both individual monetary and ﬁscal policies are used;
3. when there is a monetary union, but individual ﬁscal policies are being pursued.
6.1 Case 1: National Monetary Policies
For the nine countries with national monetary policies but no ﬁscal policies, there are nine central
banks (CBi,i = 1,...,9) that play an LQ game. Every exhaustive and disjoint division of players
into coalitions is called a coalition structure (CS). For 9 players there exist 21147 possible coalition
structures; we only focus on the two structures, that are mostly studied in the literature due to the
fact that they are most relevant for policy analysis:
• NC — the non-cooperative regime in which all the players play against each other:
{{CB1},...,{CB9}}; and
• C — the grand coalition in which all the players play together:
{{CB1,...,CB9}}
We consider two types of shocks - symmetric and asymmetric:
17Technical details can be found in Appendix D.
19(a) Symmetric price level shock that hits all the countries with equal size.
This is modeled by choosing the initial state of the system as x0S :=
 




(b) Asymmetric price level shock that hits only the ﬁrst country.
This is modeled by choosing the initial state of the system as x0A :=
 
0 ... 0 1 0 ... 0
 
.
The loss functions are parameterized as follows: αF
j = 1; βF
j = 1; χF
j = 2; αM
j = 1; βM
j = 1;
χM
j = 1; αM
U = 1; βM
U = 1; and χM
U = 1. Optimal losses for both a symmetric and asymmetric shock
are presented in Table 8.
Player N C N C
CB1 11238.3348 521.0502 11703.1069 498.6518
CBi, i = 2,··· ,9 11238.3348 521.0502 11048.4801 524.7885
Table 8: Optimal losses for the case of national monetary policies, symmetric shock (LHS) vs.
asymmetric shock (RHS)
Table 8 shows that in a cooperative regime, losses of the country that is hit by an asymmetric
price shock are lower than those for the countries that are not hit by this shock; such phenomenon
does not occur under a non-cooperative regime.
6.1.1 Non-cooperative regime
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the non-cooperative regime are presented
in Figure 6.1. Like in all next ﬁgures the horizontal axis represents the time line (in years). We
focus only on the exchange rates and price levels for country 1 and 2 in these ﬁgures, because in our
asymmetric benchmark simulation country 1 is the country that is hit by the price level shock. So
the graphs for country i, i = 3,··· ,9, coincide with that for country 2. The graphs in Figure 6.1
illustrate an adjustment process that are in line with our ﬁndings of Section 5, that is, an exponential
growth of prices and exchange rates if an asymmetric shock occurs and convergence of prices to some
new level if a symmetric shock occurs. The corresponding sample dynamics of output gaps and
control instruments for the same regime are presented in Figure 6.2. These graphs are again in line
with the results of Section 5.
6.1.2 The grand coalition
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the grand coalition are presented in Figure
6.3, whereas the sample dynamics of output gaps and control instruments for the same regime are
presented in Figure 6.4. These graphs illustrate again the results from Section 5. That is, prices that
now always converge towards a new equilibrium value, irrespective of the kind of shock that occurs.
6.2 Case of national monetary and ﬁscal policies
In our estimated model, there is no eﬀect of ﬁscal instruments on output, likely due to the fact that
in the past years ﬁscal instruments were not used to cope with economic shocks. If ASEAN countries
20Figure 6.1: Sample exchange rates and price levels, national monetary policies: the non-cooperative
regime
Figure 6.2: Sample output gaps and control variables, national monetary policies: the non-
cooperative regime
21Figure 6.3: Sample exchange rates and price levels, national monetary policies: the grand coalition
Figure 6.4: Sample output gaps and control variables, national monetary policies: the grand regime
would form a monetary union, it is hard to imagine that participating countries will not use their
ﬁscal instruments if hit by a country speciﬁc price shock. Therefore, based on parameter values
obtained for other countries such as European ones, we calibrate η = 1
8.
22Player N C {F}CB F{CB} {F}{CB}
Fi, i = 1,··· ,9 9363.7119 276.5691 2077.7552 244.1103 276.9911
CBi, i = 1,··· ,9 9458.7378 448.9673 276.1023 527.6308 448.8899
Player N C {F}CB F{CB} {F}{CB}
F1 9890.7752 272.2497 2000.6522 244.2389 273.9849
CB1 9994.0481 428.7797 290.9468 504.8956 431.5522
Fi, i = 2,··· ,9 9187.2802 281.5022 2071.7061 248.9385 281.7456
CBi, i = 2,··· ,9 9280.4469 453.4449 277.8544 531.4473 453.0123
Table 9: Optimal losses for the case of national monetary and ﬁscal policies, symmetric shock (top)
vs. asymmetric shock (bottom)
With this calibration, we consider the consequences of countries involved in active ﬁscal policies.
For 9 countries that maintain both national monetary and national ﬁscal policies, there are 18 players
that play the LQ game - 9 central banks (CBi,i = 1,...,9) and 9 governments (Fi,i = 1,...,9).
Since there are too many possible coalitions, many of them being not realistic from a practical point
of view, we focus on ﬁve important coalition structures:
• NC — the non-cooperative regime in which all the players play against each other:
{{CB1},{F1},...,{CB9},{F9}}
• C — the grand coalition in which all the players play together:
{{CB1,F1,...,CB9,F9}}
• {F}CB — all the ﬁscal players in a coalition playing against individual central banks:
{{F1,...,F9},{CB1},...,{CB9}}
• F{CB} — all the central banks in a coalition playing against individual governments:
{{F1},...,{F9},{CB1,...,CB9}}
• {F}{CB} — all the governments in a coalition playing against the central banks in a coalition:
{{F1 ...,F9},{CB1,...,CB9}}.
The same shocks as in the previous section are considered and the optimal losses are presented
in Table 9.
From Table 9 we see that ﬁscal players gain when central banks cooperate. In case central banks
cooperate we see that for any type of shock, it does not make much diﬀerence whether all players
cooperate or there is just cooperation between ﬁscal and monetary policymakers separately. Further-
more, if monetary authorities cooperate ﬁscal players are best oﬀ if they choose not to cooperate.
We also note that the country hit by an asymmetric shock suﬀers the least from it if some kind of
cooperation occurs between either ﬁscal and/or monetary authorities, and it is in fact better oﬀ than
the ﬁscal players that are not hit by this shock.
236.2.1 Non-cooperative regime
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the non-cooperative regime are presented in
Figure 6.5. We see a similar impulse response as in Figure 6.1 from Section 6.1, with exponential
growth of prices and exchange rates in case of an asymmetric shock and convergence of prices to a
new equilibrium level in case of a symmetric shock. Nevertheless, the growth under an asymmetric
shock is larger, whereas the new equilibrium price level under a symmetric shock is lower. Thus, the
eﬀect of having additionally ﬁscal players in the non-cooperative setting seems to be that symmetric
shocks are better absorbed, whereas the asymmetric shocks are dealt with worse. So, basically, the
eﬀects that were already observed in Section 5 are intensiﬁed. These eﬀects are also conﬁrmed by
the adjustments of output gaps and control instruments shown in Figure 6.6. The asymmetric shock
requires now by far more control eﬀort compared to Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.5: Sample exchange rates and price levels, national monetary and ﬁscal policies: the non-
cooperative regime
6.2.2 The grand coalition
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the grand coalition are presented in Figure
6.7. This ﬁgure shows that the adjustment towards the new (higher) equilibrium value under a
symmetric and asymmetric shock almost coincide. Comparing Figures 6.3 and 6.7, we observe that
with ﬁscal intervention, prices converge to an equilibrium value that diﬀers more from the original
value. In fact the adjustment process under a symmetric shock with and without the consideration
of ﬁscal intervention almost coincide, whereas the adjustment process under an asymmetric shock is
faster when countries use active ﬁscal policies. These eﬀects are also visible in the graphs of output
gaps and control instruments (Figure 6.8 vs. Figure 6.4).
24Figure 6.6: Sample output gaps and control variables, national monetary and ﬁscal policies: the
non-cooperative regime
So grosso modo these simulations of Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 suggest that even in case ﬁscal in-
struments are actively used one can expect a similar adaptation process of prices and exchange
diﬀerentials like we observed in Section 5 under a non-cooperative and a full cooperative regime.
6.3 Monetary union
When a monetary union is created, there are 10 players altogether that play an LQ game (i.e. 9
governments and 1 union central bank). Consider as before the following three important coalition
structures:
• NC — the non-cooperative regime in which all the players play against each other:
{{F1},...,{F9},{CB}}
• C — the grand coalition in which all the players play together:
{{F1,...,F9,CB}}
• {F}CB — all the ﬁscal players in a coalition playing against the central bank:
{{F1,...,F9},{CB}}.
The optimal losses for both shocks considered are presented in Table 10.
25Figure 6.7: Sample exchange rates and price levels, national monetary and ﬁscal policies: the grand
coalition
Figure 6.8: Sample output gaps and control variables, national monetary and ﬁscal policies: the
grand coalition
26Player N C {F}
Fi, i = 1,··· ,9 244.1103 243.4665 276.9911
CBU 527.6308 512.0206 448.8899
Player N C {F}
F1 251.7005 244.0778 271.2793
Fi, i = 2,··· ,9 248.4597 248.5424 282.3203
CBU 528.3017 512.7220 450.4534
Table 10: Optimal losses for the case of monetary union, symmetric shock (top) vs. asymmetric
shock (bottom)
From Table 10, we see that under a SEAMU ﬁscal authorities in fact loose when they cooperate
against the central bank, which gains. Furthermore, under full cooperation there is only a small gain
to be obtained for ﬁscal players under a symmetric shock. Under an asymmetric shock, the country
that is hit by this shock and the central bank proﬁt most from full cooperation. On the other hand
the central bank can proﬁt much more if it stays outside the ﬁscal coalition. So there is a conﬂict of
interests between ﬁscal authorities and monetary authorities concerning the question whether they
should cooperate or not when an asymmetric shock occurs.
Also notice again that in case ﬁscal authorities of a country hit by an asymmetric shock cooperate
with other ﬁscal authorities, those countries will bear a larger cost than the country that is hit by
the shock.
There are many diﬀerences to the non-SEAMU case we considered in Section 6.2, Table 9. First,
if central banks cooperate in the non-SEAMU case, regardless of the coalition structure, there is no
scenario where both ﬁscal players and central banks are better oﬀ. Regardless of the type of shock,
either central banks gain or ﬁscal players gain, but not both simultaneously. If a grand coalition is
formed, the ﬁscal players gain and the central banks loose as compared to SEAMU. If an asymmetric
shock occurs, the ﬁscal player that is hit by the shock is under a SEAMU best oﬀ in the grand
coalition, whereas in the non-SEAMU case he is best oﬀ in a situation where central banks cooperate
and ﬁscal players act individually. The central bank(s) prefer to play against a ﬁscal coalition in
both cases.
6.3.1 Non-cooperative regime
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the non-cooperative regime are presented in
Figure 6.9. Compared to the non-cooperative regime with no SEAMU, with active ﬁscal policies, we
observe that if a symmetric shock occurs prices almost instantly adapt to almost the original prices.
Furthermore, the price divergence in case an asymmetric shock occurs is less pronounced. Sample
dynamics of output gaps and control instruments for the same regime are presented in Figure 6.10.
27Figure 6.9: Sample exchange rates and price levels, monetary union: the non-cooperative regime
Figure 6.10: Sample output gaps and control variables, monetary union: the non-cooperative regime
286.3.2 The grand coalition
Sample dynamics of exchange rates and price levels for the grand coalition are presented in Figure
6.11. Sample dynamics of output gaps and control instruments for the same regime are illustrated
in Figure 6.12. Compared to the non-cooperative scenario, we see that for a symmetric shock the
convergence speed to the new price level is smaller and that this new price level also diﬀers more
from the original price level than in the non-cooperative situation. Compared to the non-SEAMU
case in which countries use active ﬁscal policies, we observe almost the same price path in case a
symmetric shock occurs. For an asymmetric shock we see that the price path to a new equilibrium
level is much slower for the country that is hit by the shock, whereas for the other countries the
diﬀerences in the price paths are much less pronounced. Therefore, the fact that the country hit
by the shock cannot use its monetary instrument in this case implies that the adaptation process
towards its new equilibrium price level is much slower.
Figure 6.11: Sample exchange rates and price levels, monetary union: the grand coalition
29Figure 6.12: Sample output gaps and control variables, monetary union: the grand coalition
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study pros and cons of further economic integration of the ASEAN countries in the
framework of a monetary union. Our contribution is twofold. First, we estimate a small scale model
for ASEAN countries except Myanmar.18 Second, we use it in a dynamic game setting to shed some
light on the above issue.
An important conclusion from our estimation procedure is that ASEAN countries did not use
ﬁscal instruments much in the considered estimation period to control their economies.
Based on the structure of the estimated model we next performed a theoretical study about
the existence of equilibria and the closed-loop behavior of the model under diﬀerent cooperation
structures. The study shows that the model predicts a behavior of inﬂation and exchange rate
diﬀerentials which seems to be in line with real observations, if we assume that ASEAN countries
cooperate.
An additional simulation study shows that the global dynamic behavior of price and exchange
rate diﬀerential paths is not changed if countries actively use ﬁscal instruments. This implies that
the above conclusion that a cooperative mode of play in our model ﬁts best with actual observations
is robust w.r.t. the assumption whether ﬁscal policies have been actively used or not.
After that we continued our simulation study to assess the eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks in diﬀerent
coalition structures and the desirability of monetary cooperation. The impulse response functions for
various shocks, symmetric or asymmetric, were calculated for diﬀerent coalition structures with and
without a monetary union using TOOLBOX, a numerical toolbox developed by Michalak, Engwerda,
and Plasmans (2011) to calculate Nash equilibria for linear quadratic diﬀerential games if players
have open-loop information.
18due to a lack of data for this country.
30The main conclusion from this study is that there are substantial gains from cooperation between
central banks in the ASEAN countries. Whether this should be in the form of a SEAMU or not
is less clear cut. Our simulations suggest that the sum of the costs involved for all monetary and
ﬁscal players is approximately the same under a SEAMU regime and a regime where central banks
cooperate. The individually incurred cost may however diﬀer, particularly under a grand coalition
regime. A detailed study, complemented with welfare analysis, is required to evaluate the eﬀects of
diﬀerent economic shocks and whether there are ways to smoothen negative eﬀects that are solely
due to the formation of a monetary union. Furthermore, it is of interest to explore to which extent
the assumptions about the ﬁscal policy accelerator, the weights chosen in the cost functions and the
exclusion of foreign trade partners aﬀect the above conclusions.
In case ASEAN countries decide to cooperate on monetary policy we show that there is a conﬂict
of interest on the issue whether ﬁscal players should cooperate with the central bank(s) or not. Fiscal
authorities beneﬁt most from a full cooperative scenario whereas cooperating monetary authorities
beneﬁt most in case they don’t cooperate with ﬁscal authorities. The simulation study also shows
that in case countries are hit by an asymmetric shock and there is some form of ﬁscal cooperation,
the countries that are not hit by this shock suﬀer more than the country that is hit. So, in case this
frequently happens there is probably little support to sustain such a cooperation from the point of
view of the countries that are almost never hit by a shock. This supports of course the OCA idea
that only ASEAN countries that have a similar economic structure and therefore are not hit too
often by country speciﬁc shocks may gain from further economic cooperation.
Given this observation and the current political structure it might be good to consider, e.g., the
pros and cons of a two-speed SEAMU.
Finally we like to stress the limitations of our approach again as we outlined in Section 4. Fur-
thermore, in the context of the ASEAN countries, launching a monetary union is a hypothetical
question as free trade is not yet fully established and there exists only a declaration of intent to move
towards a customs union. As such our study is just one item in the process of getting insight into
all expected advantages and disadvantages of forming a SEAMU (and where, for its formation, of
course not only economic arguments play a role).
Appendix A
Introducing x = [˜ e1 ···˜ eN−1 p1 ···pN]T model (17-19) can be rewritten as






P4(N+j)ij(t) + P5c (23)






P9(N+j)ij(t) + P10c, x(0) = x0, (24)
where c = 1 and, introducing J = 1
N−1(1N1T










− δ(IN − J)
 
; P3 = φJ; (25)












































j ) is the jth unit vector in I RN (I RN−1), 1N ∈ I RN denotes the vector [1···1]T, 0N ∈ I RN
the vector [0···0]T, 0n×m ∈ I Rn×m the zero matrix and IN ∈ I RN×N the identity matrix.
For analyzing the pros and cons of a monetary union, we consider only the case where all countries
are in SEAMU. The model is:
y(t) = P1 ˙ x(t) + P2x(t) + P3y(t) + P4i(t) + P5c (30)
˙ x(t) = P6 ˙ x(t) + P7x(t) + P8y(t) + P9i(t) + P10c,x(0) = x0. (31)
Here i(t) is the nominal interest rate set by the common central bank. Matrix P4 = γ1N, matrix





ψ + N − 1
; ˆ c2 :=
(N − 2)ψ − (N − 1)
(ψ − 1)(ψ + N − 1)
; ˜ c2 =
ψ(N − 1)
(ψ − 1)(ψ + N − 1)
;
p1 = 1 + γζˆ c2; p2 := γζ˜ c2 + φ;
ρ1 =
(N − 2)p2 − (N − 1)p1
(p2 − p1) ∗ ((N − 1)p1 + p2)
; ρ2 :=
(N − 1)p2
(p2 − p1) ∗ ((N − 1)p1 + p2)
;
ˆ b1 = ζη(ˆ c2ρ1 +
˜ c2ρ2
N − 1
); ˆ b2 = ζη(ˆ c2ρ2 + ˜ c2ρ1 −
˜ c2ρ2(N − 2)
N − 1
);
˜ b1 = β1¯ c2 + ζγ(ˆ c2ρ1 +
˜ c2ρ2
N − 1







˜ b2 = β1¯ c2 + ζγ(ˆ c2ρ2 + ˜ c2ρ1 −
˜ c2ρ2(N − 2)
N − 1







Notice ˆ c2 − ˜ c2 = 1

















¯ P1 := I − P1(I − P6)
−1P8 − P3 = p1In − p2J, and ¯ P
−1 = ρ1IN − ρ2J.
If we deﬁne u as u = [f1 ···fNi1 ···iN]T, the reduced form of the model (23-24) is then:
˙ x(t) = ˆ Ax(t) + ˆ Bu(t) + ˆ E1c,x(0) = x0 (32)
y(t) = ˆ Cx(t) + ˆ Du(t) + ˆ E2c, (33)
with the matrices ˆ A- ˆ D given by19
ˆ A = (I − P6)













ˆ B = (I − P6)
−1(P8 ˆ D + P9)
=
 
0(N−1)×N β1(IN−1 − JN−1) −
β1
N−11N−1
ˆ b1IN −ˆ b2J ˜ b1IN −˜ b2J
 
;
ˆ E1 = (I − P6)
















ˆ C = ¯ P
−1
1 (P1(I − P6)





− IN + J
 
;
ˆ D = ¯ P
−1










η(ρ1IN − ρ2J) γ(ρ1IN − ρ2J)
 
;
ˆ E2 = ¯ P
−1
1 (P1(I − P6)
−1P10 + P5) = (α + (˜ c2 − ˆ c2)¯ β0γ)(ρ1 − ρ2)1N
=
α(1 − ψ) − ¯ β0γ
γζ + (1 − φ)(1 − ψ)
1N.
Appendix C
In this appendix we consider the case that the model parameters η and δ are both zero. Substitution
of this into the results obtained in Appendix B yields then, using the next notation,
d1 = γρ1 − γβ1¯ c2(ρ1 +
ρ2
N − 1





¯ β0(1 − φ) + ζα
γζ + (1 − φ)(1 − ψ)
; ˆ e2 =
α(1 − ψ) − ¯ β0γ
γζ + (1 − φ)(1 − ψ)
,
19For the relationship between the Pi matrices and the reduced form matrices one may consult e.g. Michalak,
Engwerda, and Plasmans (2011).
33the next expressions for the reduced form model matrices
ˆ A = 0(2N−1)×(2N−1);
ˆ B =
 
0(N−1)×N β1(IN−1 − JN−1) −
β1
N−11N−1









ˆ C = 0N×(2N−1);
ˆ D = [0N×N d1IN − d2J];
ˆ E2 = ˆ e21N.
Remark 7.1 Notice that up to this moment the formal interpretation of ˙ x is that it represents
the value of x(t) − x(t − 1). However, since the parameter δ = 0 and consequently both matrix
ˆ A and ˆ C are zero, it can be easily shown (following Kwakernaak and R. (1972), see also Michalak
(2009)[Section 4.7.3]) that the exact continuous time model that coincides at the discrete points in
time with the discrete time model has the same parameters. For that reason we will interpret the
above model in the continuous time setting where time is expressed in years. ￿
To ﬁnd the non-cooperative open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibria of this game, we follow the approach of
Michalak, Engwerda, and Plasmans (2011) (see also Engwerda (2005) or Engwerda (2001)). Introduc-
ing the transformed state ˜ x(t) = e− 1
2θ[xT(t) c]T, control ˜ u(t) = e− 1
2θu(t) and output ˜ y(t) = e− 1
2θy(t)
the reduced form model dynamics can be rewritten as




˜ y(t) = [ ˆ C ˆ E2]˜ x(t) + ˆ D˜ u(t),
where
A =

























0(N−1)×N β1(IN−1 − JN−1) −
β1
N−11N−1









































































































34Here, with ˆ di = (
d2






















i ˆ e2 ˆ di βF


























i ˆ e2 ˆ di βM









, i = 1,··· ,N,
where all non-speciﬁed matrix entries are zeros. Following the notation of Michalak, Engwerda, and
Plasmans (2011) (see also Engwerda (2005) or Engwerda (2001)) we obtain from these Mi matrices
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i (IN−1 − JN−1) eT
i (˜ b1IN −˜ b2J) 0
0(N−i)×2N



















i ) + d1 diag(βM
i )(d1IN − d2J)
 
.
Using the above matrices one can calculate then the next matrix M, which eigenstructure determines


































1 ··· ˜ B
T
2N].
Theorem 7.2 Matrix M has N eigenvalues equal to −1
2θ, (4N − 1)N eigenvalues equal to 1
2θ and
the other 2N eigenvalues determined by an 2N × 2N matrix ˜ M given by (34) below.
Proof:
Since ˜ BT
i = 02N×2N, i = 1,··· ,N it follows that M has 2N ∗ N eigenvalues 1
2θ.
Since the last column of ˜ BT
i = 02N×1, i = N + 1,··· ,2N it follows that M has N eigenvalues 1
2θ.
Since row 1 until (2N − 1) of Zi is zero, i = N + 1,··· ,2N and all rows of Qi+N, i = 1,··· ,N,
except row 2N and (N −1+ i) are zero it follows that M has additionally (2N −2)∗ N eigenvalues
1
2θ.
Since column 1 until (2N − 1) of Z is zero and column 1 until (N − 1) of Qi, i = 1,··· ,2N is
zero it follows that M has N − 1 eigenvalues −1
2θ.
Finally, since row 2N of B is zero it follows that M has 1 additional eigenvalue −1
2θ.
Taking the above eigenvalues into account it follows that the remaining eigenvalues of M are






A(N : 2N − 1,N : 2N − 1) 0N×N
−QN+1(N,N : 2N − 1)
. . .
−Q2N(2N − 1,N : 2N − 1)

































































= −˜ b1(˜ b1IN −˜ b2J)[diag(χ
M
i ) + d1 diag(β
M
i )(d1IN − d2J)]
−1.
36￿
By considering the eigenstructure of matrix ˜ M above in some more detail we arrive to the next
conclusion.
Corollary 7.3 The game has at most one OLN equilibrium.
Proof. Notice that






























So, we conclude that whenever λ is an eigenvalue of ˜ M, also −λ is an eigenvalue of − ˜ M. So, ˜ M
has at most N stable eigenvalues and therefore, by Theorem 7.2, matrix M has at most 2N stable
eigenvalues. Consequently, see e.g. Engwerda (2001), the game has at most one OLN equilibrium.
￿
Next we concentrate on the symmetric case (i.e. all monetary policymakers share the same cost



















(α + β)(α − (N − 1)β)










)β − α)IN − βJ]
(α1IN − β1J)(α2IN − β2J) = (α1α2 +
β1β2
N − 1





Lemma 7.5 Let H1 = (α + β)IN − β1N1T






are λ = ±
 
θ2 + Nβ  −  (α + β) with multiplicity one and λ = ±
 
θ2 −  (α + β) with multiplicity
N − 1.
37Proof.






)det(H − λI2N) = det(
 
−(θ + λ)IN H1
0
− 
θ+λH1 + (θ − λ)IN
 
)
= det(−(θ + λ)IN)det(
− 
θ + λ
H1 + (θ − λ)IN) = det( H1 + (λ
2 − θ
2)IN)









2 +  (α + β))IN)
= (λ
2 − θ
2 +  (α + β)) −  βN)(λ
2 − θ
2 +  (α + β))
N−1,
from which the result follows now directly. ￿
Corollary 7.6 If H1 = (α1IN − β1J)(α2IN − β2J)−1 then the eigenvalues of matrix H are λ =
±
 
θ2 +  
α1−β1
β2−α2 with multiplicity one and λ = ±
 






Proof. From Lemma 7.4 we have
H1 = (α1IN − β1J)
N − 1




)β2 − α2)IN − β2J]
=
N − 1








−[α1β2 + ((1 −
1
N − 1






(β2 − α2)(β2 + (N − 1)α2)
{α1((N − 2)β2 − (N − 1)α2 + β1β2)IN − (α1β2 − α2β1)(1N1
T
N − IN)}.
So, following the notation from Lemma 7.5, we have that
θ
2 + Nβ  −  (α + β) = θ
2 +
 
(β2 − α2)(β2 + (N − 1)α2)
{(N − 1)(α1β2 − α2β1) −
α1((N − 2)β2 − (N − 1)α2) − β1β2}
= θ




From this then straightforwardly the advertised result follows. ￿
Corollary 7.7 The game has at most one equilibrium. In case there is an equilibrium, αM
i = αM,
χM
i = χM and βM
i = βM, i = 1,··· ,N, the eigenvalues of the closed-loop matrix are −1
2θ with
multiplicity N; λ1 = −
 
(1
2θ)2 + αM α1−β1
β2−α2 with multiplicity one and λ2 = −
 
(1
2θ)2 − αM β1+(N−1)α1
β2+(N−1)α2
with multiplicity N − 1, where α1 = −˜ b2
1, β1 = −˜ b1˜ b2, α2 = χM + βMd2
1 and β2 = βMd1d2.
38Proof. First notice that ˜ M is a Hamiltonian matrix. So its eigenvalues are symmetrically distributed
w.r.t. the imaginary axis. Consequently it has at most N stable eigenvalues. From which we obtain
the conclusion that the game has at most one equilibrium.
The other statement follows directly from Corollary 7.6, using the structure of matrix H1 in (34) and
the additional assumptions on the weighting matrices. ￿
Lemma 7.8
1) The solutions Ki of the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations have the following structure:
Ki = ei+N−1[01×(N−1) k
1T
i ] + e2N[01×(N−1) k
2T
i ], where k
j
i ∈ I R
N,j = 1,2 and Ki+N = Ki, i = 1,··· ,N.












where, with λi as in Corollary 7.7, S = λ2IN +
λ1−λ2
N 1N1T
N and VN−1 = τ1IN−1 + τ21(N−1)1T
(N−1), for
some τi ∈ I R.
Proof. From the structure of the matrices Ki the structure of matrix Acl follows, with S =
 1IN +  21N1T
N, for some  i ∈ I R. From Corollary 7.7 it follows next that matrix S has the eigen-
values λ1 with multiplicity one and λ2 with multiplicity N −1. Next notice that the trace of matrix
S equals the sum of its eigenvalues and 1N is an eigenvector of S corresponding with the eigenvalue
 1 + N 2, with multiplicity one. From this we obtain the next two equations for  i:  1 + N 2 = λ1
and N( 1 +  2) = λ1 + (N − 1)λ2. From which the advertised formula for S results. ￿
Theorem 7.9 (symmetric country case)
Under the above mentioned parameter restrictions under a non-cooperative equilibrium regime price



















˜ e(t) = [VN−1 1N−1]
  t
0
p(s)ds + f1t1N−1 + ˜ e0.
Proof. Under the assumption that a non-cooperative equilibrium exists if follows from Lemma 7.8,
item 2., that the equilibrium closed-loop dynamics of the transformed state, ˜ x(t) = e− 1
2θtx(t), satisﬁes
the diﬀerential equation
˙ ˜ x(t) = Acl˜ x(t), ˜ x(0) = x0.
So, the closed-loop dynamics of the untransformed state vector are given by
˙ x(t) = (Acl +
1
2
θI)x(t), x(0) = x0.
39So, p(t) and ˜ e(t) satisfy
˙ p(t) = (S +
1
2
θIN)p(t) + f21N, p(0) = p0 (36)
˙ ˜ e(t) = [VN−1 1N−1]p(t) + f11N−1, ˜ e(0) = e0. (37)
Notice that the eigenvalues of matrix S + 1
2θIN are λ1 + 1
2θ with multiplicity one and λ2 + 1
2θ with
multiplicity N − 1.









˜ e(t) = [VN−1 1N−1]
  t
0
p(s)ds + f1t1N−1 + ˜ e0.
Due to the structure of matrix S + 1
2θIN it follows that e(S+ 1
2θIN)t has the same structure, i.e.
 1(t)IN +  2(t)1N1T
N, for some  i(t) ∈ I R too. Following the lines of the proof of Lemma 7.8 it
follows that  i(t) should satisfy the equations  1(t) + N 2(t) = e(λ1+ 1
2θ)t and N( 1(t) +  2(t)) =
e(λ1+ 1
2θ)t+(N −1)e(λ2+ 1
2θ)t, i = 1,2. This yields  1(t) = e(λ2+ 1




Substitution of this into the above equation for p(t) yields then the result. ￿






θ)2 + αM 0.0342





θ)2 − αM 0.0324
8χM + 0.3125βM.
So an OLN non-cooperative equilibrium exists if and only if λi exist as a real number. In that case
0 < λ2 + 1
2θ < 1
2θ. From Theorem 7.9 we conclude therefore that if there is a symmetric price shock




rate diﬀerentials have a linear trend if λ1 < −1
2 θ (which occurs iﬀ. χM > 0.2093βM). In case either
λ1 >
−1
2 θ or there is an asymmetric price shock and there is an equilibrium, there will be a constant
inﬂation rate of at most 1
2θ. The exchange rate diﬀerentials will behave like the price paths in this
case.
Finally we consider the eﬀect of the diﬀerent weight parameters in the cost function on the game.













β1 + (N − 1)α1












αM(d1d2 + (N − 1)d2
1)(β1 + (N − 1)α1)











(N − 1)αM(β1 + (N − 1)α1)
(β2 + (N − 1)α2)2 .
￿













∂αM = sgn(χM − 0.2093βM). ￿
Appendix D
Like in Appendix C we consider here the symmetric model under the assumption that η = δ = 0. We
consider here the social outcome in some detail. That is the cooperative scenario where it is assumed
that all countries cooperate and the involved cost function is the sum of the individual cost of the
countries. That is, the policies are determined by solving the next optimization problem (using the

























N(βF + βM)ˆ e2
2 01×N (βF + βM)ˆ e2(d1 − d2)1T
N
0N×1 χFIN


























. To solve this problem we consider the with this problem corre-
sponding Hamiltonian matrix, Ham :=
 
A − BR−1V T −BR−1BT




Theorem 7.12 Matrix Ham has N eigenvalues equal to −1
2θ, (4N − 1)N eigenvalues equal to 1
2θ
and the other 2N eigenvalues determined by the 2N × 2N matrix ˜ Ham given by (38) below.
Proof:
From the structure of matrix Ham it follows directly that this matrix has N −1+1 eigenvalues −1
2θ
(see columns 1 until N −1 and row 2N) and N −1+1 eigenvalues 1
2θ (see row 2N +1 until 3N and
column 4N). It is easily veriﬁed that the remaining eigenvalues from Ham are then obtained as the




2θIN −(˜ b1IN −˜ b2J)R
−1






41where R22 := (βF + βM)(γ1IN + γ21N1T
N) + χMIN. ￿
Notice that ˜ Ham has the same structure as matrix ˜ M we considered in (34) of Appendix C. Intro-
ducing
ν1 = γ1 ∗ (β
F + β
M) + χ










2; ν4 = −








˜ b2 − 2˜ b1),
we have that R22 = ν1In+ν2J and −(˜ b1IN−˜ b2J)R
−1
22 (˜ b1IN−˜ b2J) = −ν3IN−ν41N1T
N. Using Lemma’s
7.4 and 7.5, respectively, we obtain then the next result.
Lemma 7.13 The eigenvalues of matrix Ham are ±1
2θ with multiplicity N, ±λc
1 with multiplicity
one and ±λc









2θ)2 + (αF + αM)ν3. ￿
Notice that ν3 + Nν4 =
(˜ b1−˜ b2)2









(αF + αM)(˜ b1 −˜ b2)2



















Furthermore, we obtain along the lines of Lemma 7.8.
Corollary 7.14
The game always has a unique cooperative equilibrium. Using the cooperative strategies ˜ u(t) =
−R−1(V T + BTK), where K is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation ATK +
KA−(KB +V )R−1(BTK +V T)+Q = 0 (which can also be obtained from the stable graph subspace
of matrix Ham), the closed-loop system matrix Ac



























i ∈ I R. ￿
As a direct consequence of Corollary 7.14 we have that the original price and exchange rate diﬀerential
trajectories are as in Theorem 7.12. However, since both λc
i are smaller than −1
2θ, we conclude that





rate diﬀerentials will have a linear trend.
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